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ABSTRACT: In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question 
by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of 
sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some 
thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to 
defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a 
paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.  
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1. Setting the Question 
Think of a certain person, for example Ingmar Bergman. Now consider: is there any-
thing it is like to have such a thought? Is it maybe that you formed a visual image of 
him, or you heard the words ‘Ingmar Bergman’ in inner speech? Neither of these 
seems to pick out what it is like for you to think about Ingmar Bergman: you might 
have the visual image while thinking about someone else with similar looks (the film 
director’s twin, say, if he had one) or you might have that bit of inner speech while 
thinking of someone else named Ingmar Bergman. The intuition that thinking as such 
has a certain phenomenality which is not the phenomenality of perceptual associated 
states is the base for those who state that there is a specific experience of thinking2. 
 It is commonly agreed that a person who is in a state of pain has a certain feeling 
or experience, that there is a specific “what-it-is-likeness” or what does it feel like for 
the subject to be in pain (Nagel, 1974). A phenomenal property is the property or 
quality of “what it is like” or what does it feel like to undergo certain states. The phe-
nomenal character of consciousness is meant to consist in the way in which the men-
tal states are experienced. The question of phenomenal consciousness usually appears 
as restricted to sensory mental phenomena while many intentional states do not seem to 
involve phenomenal consciousness. Beliefs or desires do not seem to involve a phe-
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nomenal character, at least without mediation of sensory experiences. The term 'ex-
perience' is thus normally used to refer to sensory experiences. While it is commonly 
agreed that sensory states possess this qualitative character, some philosophers cast 
doubt on the fact that there is something such as a specific cognitive3 experience or a 
specific experience of thinking.  
 
 The question at stake is then: when there is an experience of thinking, is its phe-
nomenal character reducible to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences? In 
other words:  
 1. Could there be two subjects with the same phenomenal sensory aspects but with 
phenomenally different thoughts?  
― If the answer is yes: the proponent of a specific cognitive phenomenology is 
right  
― If the answer is no: the opponent of a specific cognitive phenomenology is right  
 My aim in this paper is to defend the thesis that there is a specific phenomenality 
for some thinking experiences4. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical 
Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I pre-
sent the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast ar-
guments and defend it against two objections.  
 For some period in the philosophy of mind, it seemed that this debate amounted 
to an obvious question: those in favour of a specific cognitive phenomenology think 
that it is true and it is simply too obvious to call for an argumentation, whereas those 
who refuse it think that it is just obvious that it is false, or just that this issue couldn’t 
bring important consequences for our view of the mind. Clearly, as Pitt (2004) points 
out, arguments on both sides are called for. And it seems that the situation is starting 
to change (see Bayne & Montague, in press). The main arguments at stage so far is:  
 In favour of a specific cognitive phenomenology:  
 1. Classical phenomenological theories of intentionality (Husserl, 1984).  
 2. Phenomenal contrast (Husserl, 1984; Pitt, 2004; , 1998; Strawson, 2010):  
― they look for cases in which there are phenomenological differences that 
aren’t grounded in sensory differences.  
 3. Epistemology (Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004). Their key premises are: 
 ― introspective knowledge (Pitt, 2004)  
 ― distinctively first-person knowledge (Siewert, 1998) 
4. Appeal to arguments found in debates about perception (Jackson's knowledge 
argument) (Goldman, 1993). 
                                                     
3 I use 'cognitive' following its use in the literature on the topic, so that it means involving thought.  
4 I remain neutral with respect to the claim that all cognitive experiences have a specific phenomenal 
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 5. Parity arguments: 
― if one has reasons to accept qualitative character for some sensory mental 
states, then one  has equal reasons to accept qualitative character for cognitive 
states (Schields, (in press)) 
 The arguments against a specific cognitive phenomenology proceed by (i) rejecting 
classical phenomenological theories of intentionality (for different reasons), (ii) ex-
plaining away the cases of phenomenal contrast by appealing to other sorts of phe-
nomenology (perceptual, emotional) (Tye & Wright, in press), (iii) rejecting the epis-
temology arguments, or (iv) appealing to assimetries between sensory and non-sensory 
states (Georgalis, 2003).  
 My aim in this paper is then to present 1) and 2) of the arguments in favour of a 
specific cognitive phenomenology and discuss two objections to 2).  
2. A Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality 
In the Logical Investigations (LU), Husserl describes the following scenarios. Someone 
listens carefully to a complex of sounds that is completely new for her so that it is 
merely an acoustic complexity and then, afterward, once she is familiarized with its 
meaning and she hears that chain of sound in a conversation, she understands it. Or 
we imagine that certain figures produce in us a merely aesthetic effect, and then sud-
denly we comprehend that they can be symbols or verbal signs. Then he asks: which is 
the difference between the two states? Where does this plus of the understood expres-
sion over the articulated sound empty of meaning lie? (LU, V, § 14 ). Husserl’s answer 
is that the difference lies in the “character” of the mental state. “Character” is the gen-
eral term which covers what he calls the “Quality” and the “Matter”5 of an act (“act” 
is the technical term for intentional experience). The Quality, or what we could call 
the “style of presentation” of the act, is the type of act ―a thought, an imagination, a 
belief, etc. ― (what in analytic terminology are propositional attitudes6), whereas the 
Matter is the aspect under which the object presents itself. Both Quality and Matter 
constitute an intentional experience or act.  
 If we want to present Husserl’s descriptions in the form of an argument, it would 
be the following (see Soldati, 2005):  
(i) Psychic acts are wholes and Matter and Quality are moments (dependent 
parts) of the whole. 
(ii) The parts of a whole have the same ontological status as the whole itself 
(principle of ontological homogeneity)7. 
                                                     
5 'Quality’ and 'Matter' are here technical terms not to be confused with some other non technical mean-
ings. I use capital letters to indicate it.  
6 For Husserl, however, not all intentional experiences or acts have a propositional content as content, he 
leaves space for non-propositional content. 
7 This principle must be restricted to the case of experiences, for it is not true in general for all parts and 
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Marta JORBA 
Theoria 68 (2010): 187-196 
190
(iii) Psychic acts as wholes are experienced.  
Therefore: The Matter and the Quality are experienced.  
 That the Matter is experienced means that the way the object is given to us (the 
object with this and that feature) is experienced, that is, that the meaning is experi-
enced (because the Matter is where the meaning as a species instantiates itself, accord-
ing to Husserl’s theory of species and particulars). Thus, the meaning of the act be-
longs to the experienced content. If the experienced content is the qualitative content, 
and if the meaning is of conceptual nature, it corresponds to it a conceptual qualitative 
content, what can be called “conceptual qualia” (see Dorsch & Soldati, 2005).  
 That the Quality is experienced means that there are experiential differences be-
tween different Qualities: whether a certain act or intentional mental state is an imagi-
nation, a perception, a thought, a judgment, etc., is recognized because they are ex-
perienced differently, they are different kind of experiences which instantiate them-
selves in token experiences.  
 We have seen a way to defend a specific phenomenality for cognitive experiences 
relying on Husserl's theory of intentionality in the LU. Once one accepts that inten-
tionality is a lived phenomenon, it follows that intentional mental episodes have phe-
nomenal character. Moreover, the difference between them is an experiential differ-
ence (see also Zahavi, 2005). The very fact that we experience a thought as a thought 
and not as an imagination or as any other kind of mental state. These experiential dif-
ferences make the phenomenal character of thinking specific, not reducible to the 
character of other experiences. This approach defends that the experience of under-
standing or of thinking in general is given in a different way as sensory experiences. 
The idea is that the thinking experience can ―and maybe should― be given through 
images but we undergo it and properly speak of it as such when these images are not 
there. Before concluding this section, two important comments should be done.  
 First of all, the question of the phenomenal character of cognitive states is some-
thing obvious for Husserl’s phenomenology or, in other words, it is not a thesis to be de-
fended but part of his central point of departure for his theory of intentionality, that is, 
part of the primitive notion (intentional experience) which sustains the theory. Maybe 
this is so because of the descriptive character of the phenomenological approach to 
intentionality, which aims to show what we find when we reflect upon our mental 
lives, without pronouncing itself on the possible reduction of intentionality to a more 
basic phenomenon (physically speaking).  
 Secondly, this theory holds a general claim with respect to our topic, namely, that 
the specificity of the phenomenal character for cognitive states is valid for all kinds of 
cognitive conscious mental states. Experiential differences amount to differences in 
kinds of cognitive mental states, for all of them8.  
 These two remarks lead to the following consideration. Since intentionality as a 
lived phenomenon was a starting point for Husserl, he didn't attempt to defend the 
                                                     
8 In fact, this thesis is also true for Husserl in the domain of all conscious mental states, not only the cog-
nitive one. Our present case -cognitive experience- is a subset of the set formed by all conscious inten-
tional states. 
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claim of a specific phenomenality for all kinds of conscious cognitive states, he just 
endorsed it. I don't defend this general claim in this paper, for which I think further 
argumentation is necessary.  
3. The Phenomenal Contrast 
Imagine two people listening to the news on a French radio program. One of them, 
Jacques, speaks French, while the other, Jack, speaks only English. We can ask 
whether Jacques, who understands what the news speaker is saying, has an experience 
of a different sort than Jack, who merely hears the French-sounding words without 
grasping their meaning. The answer is that they both have different cognitive 
experiences although they have the same sensory experience (they hear the same chain 
of sounds). Jacques has an experience of understanding while Jack doesn’t.  
 The example was put forward in detail by Strawson (2010, p. 5) (although it dates 
back to Husserl, as we have seen): 'consider what it is like, experientially, to hear 
someone speaking non technically in a language that one understands. One 
understands what is said, and one undoubtedly has an experience. How do the 
understanding and the experience relate? Most will agree that the experience is 
complex, and that it is not merely sensory, not just a matter of the sounds. But they 
will hesitate if it is suggested that there is experience (as) of understanding'. The 
experience is 'as' of understanding because it need not be veridical: 'misunderstanding 
involves understanding-experience as much as genuine understading does, for 
understanding-experience is experience as of understanding and need not be veridical. 
(It could be called 'meaning-experience')' (idem, p.7). He argues for this 
understanding-experience over and above visual and auditory experience.  
 This argument points to a phenomenal contrast between the mental state of 
understanding and that of not understanding. Its tenet is to show that sensory 
experiences can not account for this contrast, leading to the conclusion that we must 
accept a specific phenomenal character for some cognitive experiences9.  
3.1. Objection 1: The Accompanying Sensory Aspects of Thought 
A common argument to deny that such phenomenology is specific to cognitive states 
it to say that thought is normally accompanied by states such as perceptual 
representations, bodily sensations, images or inner utterances, so that the phenomenal 
qualities we find in thought are in fact constituted by these mental images and not by 
the experience of thinking itself. My experience of thinking that p is experiential in so 
far as I sensory hear or read or imagine the utterance p.  
 In this line of reasoning, Burge (2007, p.399) asserts that 'when thought is 
phenomenally conscious, its being phenomenally conscious derives from its making 
use of phenomenal qualities that derive from more primitive psychological systems'. 
Carruthers (2006, p. 6-7) has the same point to make: '... thoughts aren’t phenomenally 
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specific phenomenal character for thought. I am aware of possible functionalist objections, but the re-
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conscious per se. Our thoughts aren’t like anything, in the relevant sense, except to the 
extent that they might be associated with visual or other images or emotional feelings, 
which will be phenomenally conscious by virtue of their quasi-sensory status. [In inner 
speech] phenomenal consciousness will attach to the imaged sounds of the sentences, 
not to the contents of those sentences, i.e. not to the thoughts that are thereby 
entertained'. And also Jackendoff (2007, p.82) claims that: 'I conclude that phonology 
is necessary and suficient for the presence of linguistic qualia, and meaning is neither 
necessary nor suficient... if we pay attention to the phenomenology of ‘conscious 
thought’, we find it most often has the form of linguistic images-‘inner speech’ or a 
‘voice in the head,’ a Joycean stream of consciousness... The form of the associated 
thought, a semantic/conceptual structure that is capable of driving inference, is not at 
all present in experience'. 
 This view seems to be part of a general philosophical attitude toward 
consciousness influenced by Wittgenstein’s (1953, § 154) attack on understanding as a 
mental process: 'In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) 
which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. (The 
increase and decrease of a sensation of pain, the hearing of a melody, of a sentence: 
mental processes)'. Wittgenstein (1953) seems to reject that understanding is a mental 
process on the basis of the argument that it is not a sensory process or experience. 
According to this quote, it seems that in order to be able to deny that we have an 
experience of understanding, he has to deny that the understanding is mental, and this 
supposes that everything that is mental is experienced. If one wants to say that there is 
no cognitive experience, one should say that it is not a mental process. And if one 
doesn’t accept Wittgenstein’s thesis and thinks that understanding is a mental process, 
one must reduce it to the experience of sensory mental states. However, as Soldati & 
Dorsch (2004) note, Wittgenstein’s argument does not address the possibility of there 
being non-sensory experiences.  
3.1.1. Replies 
1. We find a reply to this objection in almost all the authors who defend a specific 
phenomenality of thought. A possible answer is that, even if this objection holds, the 
phenomenal character of these sensory states would be only contingently linked to the 
content of the respective propositional state. An example: we express a thought about 
a cat in English with the word ‘cat’ and not with another one, but this is not essential 
to the thought itself. 
 But the objection can come again: one could insist that the qualitative character of 
these experiences belong exclusively to the accompanying sensory representations and 
that it is independent of their conceptual content. It seems plausible to maintain that, 
since the sensory representations usually occur in conjunction with particular 
thoughts, we have the tendency to take the phenomenal character of sensory represen-
tations to be a feature of the non-sensory thoughts.  
2. The straightforward response here is that it is plausible to claim that the states in 
question can, and often do, occur without the simultaneous presence of sensory rep-
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resentations, of symbols or signs. When one hears the sentence 'The Eiffel Tower is 
going to be dismantled', one will normally form a visual image of the Eiffel Tower in 
this particular process described. But others will not, and such an imagining is not a 
necessary accompaniment nor it is part of the understanding experience. Siewert 
(1998, p. 277) has put forward examples of thoughts that are too complex and disap-
pear in such an immediate way that it would be impossible to sensory represent (audi-
tory or by images) the sentences at the same time: 'you are standing at the door to 
your house, reaching in your pants pockets for the door key, and you find it empty. 
You feel a sudden panic; you think perhaps you have locked yourself out; you try to 
remember where you put the keys, then recall switching them to your coat pocket ear-
lier; you reach and find them there ―relief'. It is a case of sudden wordless thought 
that involves a kind of anxiety. In this case, however, one could think that the phe-
nomenal character is produced by the anxiety that the situation produces, which may 
not be necessarily thought of as a specific cognitive state.  
 So I think that what is called for are instances in which a thought occurs to you, 
when not only do you not visualize what you think, but you also don’t verbalize the 
thought, either aloud or silently, nor are you understanding someone else’s words. Ex-
amples of this sort could be an abrupt shift in the direction of thought, as for instance 
when you are doing something ―let’s say cooking― and you are occupied with the 
task and thinking about the ingredients and so on, and you suddenly remember (it 
comes to you in an instant) an appointment you had.  
3. These examples show cases in which we have non-iconic thought, to use Siewert’s 
terminology. But we can also respond to the objection by saying that the phenomenal-
ity of thinking and the phenomenality of imagery or sounds vary independently of 
each other, and therefore the latter can not be identified with the former. Two differ-
ent thoughts can have the same associated images but nonetheless different phe-
nomenal character: I can imagine the same image of the Eiffel Tower both with the 
thought 'The Eiffel Tower is 300 meters tall' and 'The Eiffel Tower is 301 meters tall' 
and nevertheless undergo phenomenally different states. And the other way round: I 
can associate different images to two utterances of the same sentence separated in 
time and nevertheless have the same phenomenal character. Another example for this 
variation is the case of homonyms: what it is like for you to think of a bark (of a dog) 
is different from what it is like for you to think of bark (of a tree), although they are 
written and pronounced identically.  
 We have seen a first objection to the specific phenomenal character for thought. I 
have argued that the objection doesn't succeed because: (i) the occurrence of sensory 
accompanying states is not a necessary condition for conscious thought, precisely be-
cause there are thoughts for which there is no possible sensory representation and 
they nevertheless have phenomenal character; (ii) the phenomenality of thinking and 
the phenomenality of sensory experiences can vary independently of each other10.  
                                                     
10 The reductionist about the phenomenality of thought also has the possibility of accounting for this 
phenomenality in terms of other associated states (emotional, the experience of trying, etc) (Tye & 
Wright, in press). I have not addressed this option here.  
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3.2. Objection 2: The "Click" and the "Aha" Experiences 
It could be argued that the phenomenal difference between thoughts is not due to 
their specific phenomenal character but to a kind of “click” or “aha!” experiences. 
These experiences would account for the phenomenal character we might think as 
specific for thought11. An experience of this kind is an experience of an interpretative 
switch. Were this the case, the phenomenal character of thought would have nothing 
to do with the experience of the content of the sentence. The appeal to this experi-
ence can be used to defend two arguments:  
(i) The “click” or the “aha!” experience is an experience in-between the two 
thoughts. The two thoughts are separated by this experience of a special phe-
nomenal character, so that the two thoughts don’t have phenomenal character 
per se.  
(ii) The “click” or the “aha!” experience is a confusion or perplexity experience 
―confusion resulting from the failure to understand, and thus not something 
specific of understanding.  
 The reply to (i) is that the phenomenal contrast between two thoughts when there 
is such an interpretative switch does not consist in the fact that one happens before, 
and one after, and in-between the two, a third experience occurs (something like a 
“click”). For there is nothing like that which happens on those occasions. The experi-
ence is more like the duck-rabbit phenomenon ―the “Gestalt switch”, where it is dif-
ficult to see this intermediate experience of a click over and above the experience of 
seeing a duck and the experience of seeing a rabbit, that is, one same kind of experi-
ence with two different ways of presenting the content (Siewert, 1998). 
 The reply to (ii) needs some steps. If this confusion experience is just not understand-
ing, this is not an objection, but rather another way of isolating the kind of experience 
we are putting forward (it seems odd to acknowledge phenomenal character to not 
understanding and not to understanding). If the confusion experience is some kind of 
positive state, like the realization that you didn't understand (Siewert, in press), then 
one already admits that there is something it is like to be struck by a thought where no 
sensory reduction is to be had ―for how could this “realization state” be of a sensory 
kind?. Another possibility is to consider this kind of confusion as a puzzlement, but 
then one can look to multiply center-embedded sentences (Pitt, 2004). These sentences are 
used for linguists to illustrate properties of our language processing abilities, 
specifically, limitations on our ability to spontaneously understand grammatically well-
formed sentences. An example is the following: 
 (1) The boy the man the girl saw chased fled.  
For most people this is not comprehensible at first reading or hearing. But if it is 
made clear what the sentence means, one’s experience of it should change. If one is 
told that (1) means  
                                                     
11 It should be noted that the experience of a “click” could not be applied to all kinds of thoughts, for 
there might not be any “click” at all between them. The objection can be sound if we think of the under-
standing experience.  
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 (1’) The boy, who was chased by the man that the girl saw, fled, 
then the experience of understanding the sentence is different. In this example the 
sentence remains difficult to understand even after it ceases to be puzzling (and even 
after you know how to analyze it), so the experience of understanding may be sepa-
rated from the experience of relief from any perplexity that the sentence may cause.  
 We have presented the “click” or “aha!” experience as a candidate for accounting 
for the phenomenal difference between thoughts, in two different versions. We have 
given reasons to think that both arguments fail to account for this phenomenal con-
trast.  
4. Final Remarks 
The preceding arguments lead to the following final remarks.  
― We find a way to defend a specific phenomenality for thought in Husserl's theory 
of intentionality in the LU. Once one accepts that intentionality is a lived 
phenomenon, it follows that intentional mental episodes have phenomenal character. 
Moreover, the difference between them is an experiential difference. These 
experiential differences make the phenomenal character of thinking specific, not 
reducible to the character of other experiences. We noted that this phenomenological 
view has a descriptive and not an explanatory or reductive aim. For Husserl, the 
specificity of the phenomenal character is a general feature for all conscious cognitive 
experiences. I don't attempt to defend this general claim in this paper, for which I 
think further argumentation is necessary. I have only shown that some thinking 
experiences, such as understanding, have a specific phenomenal character.  
― By introducing the experience of understanding and arguing that its phenomenal 
character is not reducible to the sensory phenomenal character we have pointed to a 
case in favour of a specific cognitive phenomenology for at least some thinking 
experiences. Therefore, we have shown that for some thinking experiences there is a 
specific phenomenal character. 
― If the thesis of a specific phenomenality of some cognitive states is true, then the 
meaning of 'experience' needs to be broadened in order to include them. Any story 
about them that leaves aside what it is like to specifically be in them is incomplete. 
And this amounts to acknowledge that the problem of phenomenality spreads into the 
domain of cognition.  
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